Katharina Bernhard
Published: 21 January 2019
Epistemological dimensions of scientific expert testimony (SET).
University of St Andrews
Epistemological dimensions of scientific expert testimony (SET).
SET is the case whenever a scientific expert asserts that p towards a receiver (usually general public or policy-makers). My research can be split in three bundles of questions that I want to answer. The first bundle regards epistemic matters on the receiver-side in SET: Am I to adopt an expert’s testimony “blindly” and substitute the belief I held with the expert’s belief? Or is an expert’s testimony merely to be added to my overall reasons I have for believing p?
The second block regards the content of scientific expert testimony: What is it that scientists provide in their testimony? The classical assumption in both philosophy of science and epistemology is that the epistemic good in question is knowledge. But, arguably, scientists often do not (and cannot) speak from knowledge, but from what their best take on a certain complex topic is. The third set of question regards practical matters of how to improve our epistemic practices of both providing and receiving scientific expert testimony. Ultimately, I want to argue that including the public earlier on in scientific research can increase sciences reliability and lay trust in SET.
First published: 21 January 2019